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Abstract
The literature on “mechanism design from samples,” which has flourished in recent years at
the interface of economics and computer science, offers a bridge between the classic computer-
science approach of worst-case analysis (corresponding to “no samples”) and the classic economic
approach of average-case analysis for a given Bayesian prior (conceptually corresponding to the
number of samples tending to infinity). Nonetheless, the two directions studied so far are two
extreme and almost diametrically opposed directions: that of asymptotic results where the
number of samples grows large, and that where only a single sample is available. In this paper,
we take a first step toward understanding the middle ground that bridges these two approaches:
that of a fixed number of samples greater than one. In a variety of contexts, we ask what is
possibly the most fundamental question in this direction: are two samples really better than one
sample?. We present a few surprising negative results, and complement them with our main
result: showing that the worst-case, over all regular distributions, expected-revenue guarantee
of the Empirical Revenue Maximization algorithm given two samples is greater than that of this
algorithm given one sample. The proof is technically challenging, and provides the first result
that shows that some deterministic mechanism constructed using two samples can guarantee
more than one half of the optimal revenue.
1 Introduction
Arguably the simplest revenue maximization problem is that of maximizing the revenue of a single
buyer from selling a single item to a single bidder. In this problem, the seller customarily possesses
some prior information about the buyer, traditionally modeled via a distribution from which the
valuation (maximum willingness to pay for the item) of the buyer is drawn, and the seller’s task
in this Bayesian model is to devise a selling mechanism that maximizes her expected revenue over
this distribution. This classic problem was completely resolved in the seminal paper of Myerson
(1981), who showed that the optimal mechanism (among all truthful, possibly even randomized,
mechanisms) is to offer the item for a take-it-or-leave-it price tailored for the given prior distribution.
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In recent years, the literature at the interface of economics and computer science, influenced by
the newly found popularity of machine learning, has seen the rise of a line of work that relaxes the
assumption of complete knowledge of the underlying distribution by the seller, to the assumption of
the seller having access to samples from this distribution. In a sense, this model offers a bridge, via
the number of samples that are available to the seller, between the classic computer-science approach
of worst-case analysis (corresponding to “no samples”) and the above-mentioned classic economic
approach of average-case analysis for a given prior distribution (conceptually corresponding to the
number of samples tending to infinity). Nonetheless, all of the results that we know of in this vein
are in one of two extreme and almost diametrically opposed directions: one looking at asymptotic
results where the number of samples grows large (Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Morgenstern and
Roughgarden, 2015, 2016; Devanur et al., 2016; Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016; Gonczarowski
and Nisan, 2017; Balcan et al., 2016; Alon et al., 2017; Balcan et al., 2018), and the other asking
what can be done with a single sample (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2015; Fu et al.,
2015). For example, a result of the former direction would tell us that under certain conditions, a
number of samples that is polynomial in certain parameters of the problem suffices for attaining
a certain approximation to the optimal revenue with high probability, while a result of the latter
direction would tell us that under certain conditions, access to a single sample from the buyer’s
distribution allows the seller to design a mechanism that attains some constant fraction of the
optimal revenue in expectation. In this paper, we take a first step towards understanding the
middle ground that bridges these two approaches: that of a fixed number of samples greater than
one. In particular, we ask what is possibly the most fundamental question in this direction: are
two samples really better than one sample?
To understand the specific context in which we ask the above question, and why it is more
involved than may be expected, we zoom-in to provide some more context. Arguably the most
natural algorithm for pricing a good given samples from an underlying distribution is the Empirical
Revenue Maximization (henceforth ERM) algorithm, which sets the price to be the one that would
maximize the expected revenue over the empirical distribution — the uniform distribution over
the given samples. For a single sample, this means offering the good for a price that equals this
sample, which is shown by Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) to guarantee a revenue of one half (!) of
the optimal revenue when the underlying distribution is regular1.2 Huang et al. (2015) have in fact
shown that this guarantee of one half cannot be improved upon by any deterministic mechanism
that is designed based on a single sample from a regular distribution.3 As the number of samples
grows large, Huang et al. (2015) show that ERM attains revenue that asymptotically tends to
optimal for regular distributions. The main question that we ask in this paper is whether, for
regular distributions, the worst-case guarantee of ERM constructed based on two samples is better,
the same, or worse, then the one-half worst-case guarantee of ERM constructed based on one
sample.
1Regularity (sometimes called Myerson-regularity) is a standard mild restriction on valuation distributions. It
is well known that without any restriction on the possible class of valuation distributions, no revenue guarantees
can be proven when constructing a mechanism from a finite number of samples. To see this, consider, for small ε, a
distribution that attains the value 0 with probability 1− ε and the value 1/ε with probability ε. The optimal expected
revenue of 1 is attained by posting a price of 1/ε, however it is futile to try and learn even the order-of-magnitude of
this price (for arbitrarily small ε) from a finite number of samples that does not itself depend on ε.
2To be completely clear, the guarantee here is that for any regular distribution, the expected revenue from this
mechanism, where the expectation is taken both over the given sample and over the bidder’s valuation (which are
drawn i.i.d. from the underlying regular distribution), is at least half of the optimal expected revenue, where this
expectation is taken over the bidder’s valuation.
3Fu et al. (2015) have nonetheless been able to slightly improve upon this guarantee of one half using a randomized
pricing mechanism.
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While it is clear that the optimal method to price an item based on two samples guarantees at
least as much revenue as the optimal method to price an item based on a single sample — indeed,
one could always ignore the second sample and only use the first sample as in the single-sample
case — it is far less clear that ERM when based on two samples should have a better worst-
case guarantee than ERM when based on a single sample.4 To drive this point home, we present
two seemingly-similar problems, for which we show that increasing the number of samples has an
undesired effect on the revenue of ERM, and an additional problem where another natural notion
of monotonicity fails to hold for ERM. To phrase these three problems, it will be convenient to use
the following notation: given a distribution F and a natural number n, we denote by ERM (F, n)
the expected revenue over F when pricing an item according to ERM given n samples from the
(underlying) distribution F .
Problem 1: Is it true that for any fixed underlying regular distribution F and any
number n, it holds that ERM (F, n+ 1) ≥ ERM (F, n)? The answer, even for n = 1, turns out
to be No! In fact, it turns out that for certain distributions F , taking more samples “confuses”
ERM, hurting revenue: ERM (F, 2) < ERM (F, 1).
Problem 2: Is it true that for any two fixed regular distributions F and G, if
ERM (F, n) > ERM (G,n) then also ERM (F, n + 1) > ERM (G,n + 1)? The answer, even
for n = 1, turns out to be No! In fact, it turns out that for certain distributions F and G, while
ERM (F, 1) > ERM (G, 1), it is in fact the case that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2).
Problem 3: Is it true that for any two fixed regular distributions F and G such
that F first-order stochastically dominates G, and for any number n, it holds that
ERM (F, n) ≥ ERM (G,n)? While for n = 1 this is known to hold, the answer, already for n = 2,
turns out to be No! In fact, it turns out that for certain such distributions F and G, while the rev-
enue from each fixed posted price is higher from F than it is from G, the structure of F “confuses”
ERM when based on two samples, hurting revenue by causing ERM to post lower-revenue prices.
The analyses of the above three problems are given in Section 3. Despite the surprising negative
answers surveyed above to all three problems, we do manage to show monotonicity in the sense
that the worst-case guarantee of the price computed by ERM based on two samples from a regular
distribution is strictly higher than one half of the optimal expected revenue obtained by setting
a posted price tailored specifically to the underlying distribution. To formalize this result, which
is our main result, it will be convenient to use the following notation: given a distribution F , we
denote by OPT (F ) the highest expected revenue over F attained by the optimal truthful mechanism
(which, recall, is a posted-price mechanism).
Theorem 1 (See Theorem 3 and Corollary 1). There exists c > 1/2 such that for every regular
distribution F , we have ERM (F, 2) > c · OPT (F ). In particular, infregular F ERM (F,2)OPT (F ) > 12 =
infregular F
ERM (F,1)
OPT (F ) .
We note that to the best of our knowledge, Theorem 1 is in fact the first result to show that some
deterministic mechanism constructed using two samples can guarantee more than one half of the
4For example, with many samples, ERM is in fact known to not be a worst-case-optimal pricing algorithm, and
to be inferior in this sense to guarded ERM (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015; Cole and Roughgarden, 2014).
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optimal revenue for every regular distribution.5 Proving Theorem 1 turns out to be a considerably
more technically challenging than may have been expected (or rather, considerably more technically
challenging than may have been expected before observing the negative answers to the above three
problems, which may be seen as evidence that the proof of Theorem 1 should be challenging), up to
the point that extending our methods even for comparing ERM for two and for three samples (let
alone for higher values of n) seems intractable. The main problem that we leave open, therefore,
is whether the monotonicity of ERM that is uncovered in Theorem 1 when going from a single
sample to two samples, holds for any number of samples.
Open Problem 1. Is it true that infregular F
ERM (F,n+1)
OPT (F ) > infregular F
ERM (F,n)
OPT (F ) for every n?
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we formally present the model
and definitions. In Section 3, we present the analysis of the above-surveyed negative results (to
Problem 1, to Problem 2, and to an additional more technical problem). In Section 4, we present
Theorem 1, which is our main result, and give a high-level overview of its proof. The proof itself is
given in Sections 5 through 7, with some calculations relegated to the appendix.
1.1 Further Related Work
The literature on “mechanism design from samples” is preceded and inspired by the literature
on prior-free and prior-independent mechanism design. Early work in Algorithmic Mechanism
Design has mainly focused on prior-free mechanism design, aiming for either worst-case welfare
approximation (e.g., Lehmann et al., 2002) or worst-case revenue approximation with respect to
some instance-specific benchmark (e.g., the best revenue when selling at least 2 items (Goldberg
et al., 2001)). For more results on prior-free mechanisms see, for example, Chapter 7 of Hartline
(2017).
The standard economic model of revenue maximization assumes that the value of each player
is drawn from a known prior distribution, and the seller aims to maximize her expected revenue
for that prior (Myerson, 1981). Bulow and Klemperer (1996) have presented a remarkable result,
showing that a seller can attain at least his optimal revenue for buyers with values drawn i.i.d.
from a regular distribution by using the VCG mechanism, as long as she can recruit one additional
buyer (whose value is drawn independently from the same distribution). This mechanism is prior-
independent in the sense that the mechanism does not depend on the priors, yet the approximation is
obtained with respect to the optimal revenue for the specific distribution, even though this optimal
revenue is unknown when the mechanism is run. Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) have initiated
the systematic study of such prior-independent mechanisms. For more results on prior-independent
mechanisms see, for example, Chapter 5 of Hartline (2017).
A slightly less demanding model than the prior-independent model is the model in which the
mechanism has access to samples from the unknown underlying distribution, with the benchmark
still being the (unknown-to-the-mechanism) optimal revenue for that specific distribution. The
current paper uses this model, and prior work in this model is surveyed in the introduction above.
A somewhat similar model where the auction is also chosen based on sampled data, which
is studied in the learning literature, is an online-learning model where the mechanism designer
can use information from prior auctions to on-line optimize the parameters of the next auction
5We emphasize again, as mentioned above, that Fu et al. (2015) have constructed a randomized mechanism for one
sample that guarantees more than one half of the optimal revenue in expectation. Our mechanism is thus the first
deterministic mechanism constructed using two samples that guarantees more than one half of the optimal revenue.
(Incidentally, our lower bound beats one half by orders of magnitude more than the lower bound of Fu et al. (2015)
— see Section 4.)
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(Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015; Weed et al., 2016). The goal in this model is to optimize the overall
performance.
The literature on “mechanism design from samples” restricts the dependence of the auction
mechanism on the full details of the buyer’s valuation distribution, by having it depend only
on sample valuations drawn from this distribution. An alternative approach to restricting the
dependence of the auction mechanism on the full details of the valuation distribution is by having
it depend only on certain statistical measures of the valuation distribution, such as its mean, its
variance, or its median (Azar and Micali, 2013; Azar et al., 2013).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model and Notation
Distributions and Revenues We consider one seller and one buyer. The seller has one good for
sale, which has no value for the seller if it is left unsold. The buyer has a private value (valuation,
i.e., maximum willingness to pay) for the good, which is drawn from some distribution F . For each
real price p, the expected revenue attained from posting price p is thus simply p · Prv∼F [v ≥ p].
The highest possible expected revenue attainable from any price is denoted by OPT(F ). The seller
does not know the value of the buyer or the distribution F .
Empirical Revenue Maximization Given n samples from F , the empirical distribution over
these n samples is simply the uniform distribution over the samples, i.e., sample i is drawn with
probability 1/n. The Empirical Revenue Maximization algorithm is given n independent samples
from F , computes the price p that maximizes the expected revenue attained from the empirical
distribution over the given n samples, and posts this price. We denote by ERM (F, n) the expected
revenue of the price computed by the ERM algorithm over a fresh draw from F (independent from
the n samples used to compute the price posted by the ERM algorithm); note that this revenue is
in expectation over both the n samples and the fresh draw.
Quantile Space For our analysis, it would be convenient to reason about the possible values
of the buyer using their quantiles. The quantile of a value v with respect to a distribution F is
q(v) = qF (v) = Prv∼F [v ≥ p] ∈ [0, 1].6 (So the revenue from posting a price p is p · q(p).) Note
that lower quantiles q correspond to higher valuations v. We also define the inverse map, from
quantiles back to values: for a quantile q ∈ [0, 1], the value corresponding to that quantile with
respect to a given atomless distribution F is denoted by v(q) = vF (q) (and is well defined since F
is atomless). We note that sampling a value v ∼ F is therefore equivalent to uniformly sampling a
quantile q ∈ [0, 1] and then taking the value corresponding to that quantile v = v(q).
Revenue Curve in Quantile Space The revenue curve (in quantile space) that corresponds to
an atomless value distribution F is the mapping r : [0, 1]→ R+ from a quantile q to the expected
revenue r(q) = v(q) · q of posting the value v(q) as the price. We note that the value function v(·)
(and hence also the distribution F ) can be recovered from the revenue curve via v(q) = r(q)q , that
is, v(q) is precisely the slope of the line connecting the origin to the point (q, r(q)). We will at times
write OPT(r) instead of OPT(F ), write vr instead of vF , etc. Note that OPT(r) = maxq∈[0,1] r(q).
6Throughout this paper, we use many definitions that depend on the distribution F . To avoid clutter, we will
omit the respective distribution F from these notations when it is clear from context.
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An atomless distribution F is called regular if its corresponding revenue curve (in quantile space)
is concave.7
2.2 Additional Notation
Definition 1 (e2). Given a regular distribution F with revenue curve r, we define e2 : [0, 1]
2 → R+,
as follows.
e2(q1, q2) = e
r
2(q1, q2) ,
{
r
(
arg maxq∈{q1,q2} v(q)
)
max
{
v(q1), v(q2)
} ≥ 2 min{v(q1), v(q2)},
r
(
arg minq∈{q1,q2} v(q)
)
otherwise;
note that
ERM (F, 2) , E(q1,q2)∼U([0,1]2) [e2(q1, q2)] .
Namely, given a pair of quantiles (q1, q2), if the value max
{
v(q1), v(q2)
}
is at least twice as large
as the value min
{
v(q1), v(q2)
}
then e2(q1, q2) is the expected revenue of the price max
{
v(q1), v(q2)
}
.
Otherwise e2(q1, q2) is the expected revenue of the price min
{
v(q1), v(q2)
}
.
During our analysis, it will be useful to work with revenue curves r that are normalized so that
OPT (r) = 1. The following simple lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix C for completeness,
justifies that this is without loss of generality.
Lemma 1. For every regular distribution F with revenue curve r, and for every α > 0, we have
that (1) vα·r(q) = α ·vr(q) for every q ∈ [0, 1], (2) eα·r2 (q1, q2) = α ·er2(q1, q2) for every q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1],
and (3) OPT (α · r) = α ·OPT (r).
2.3 A Single Sample
In their paper, Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) show that a celebrated theorem by Bulow and Klem-
perer (1996) can be reinterpreted to imply that ERM guarantees one half of the optimal expected
revenue for every regular distribution.
Theorem 2 (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015). ERM (F, 1)≥ 12OPT (F ) for every regular distribution F .
Furthermore, this is tight, i.e., the constant 12 cannot be replaced with any larger constant in this
statement.
Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) also give a direct simple proof for Theorem 2 that does not use
Bulow and Klemperer’s result: recall that the quantile of a value drawn from F is distributed
uniformly in [0, 1]. Therefore, the expected revenue by using a value drawn from F as a price is
precisely the integral of the revenue curve r, i.e., the area under the curve r(·). Since this curve is
convex, the area under it is at least half of the height of the highest point on this curve. (This bound
is tight: fixing any triangular revenue curve, there exists a sequence of regular distributions whose
revenue curves uniformly converge to this triangular curve. Thus, revenue curves with areas under
them that are arbitrarily close to one half of the height of their highest point can be constructed.)
Theorem 2 therefore follows since this height is precisely OPT (r) = OPT (F ).
As noted in the introduction, while the bound of one half from Theorem 2 cannot be im-
proved upon by any deterministic mechanism, Fu et al. (2015) do manage to nonetheless construct,
using one sample, a randomized pricing mechanism that guarantees a strictly higher revenue of
(0.5 + 5× 10−9) ·OPT (F ) > 12 ·OPT (F ).
7While the more popular definition of regularity (Myerson, 1981) is phrased using virtual values, these two stan-
dard definitions are known to be equivalent (in fact, the definition used here is more general as it also applies to
nondifferentiable revenue curves). Indeed, it is well known that the derivative of the revenue curve at quantile q
is Myerson’s virtual value at v(q), and so the definition of regularity as the virtual-value function being increasing
corresponds to the derivative of the revenue curve being decreasing, i.e., to the revenue curve being convex.
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3 Three Negative Results
In this section we present the analysis of the three negative results surveyed in the introduction.
Proposition 1. There exists a regular distribution F such that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (F, 1).
Proof. The equal revenue distribution is the distribution supported on [1,∞) with revenue 1 for
every posted price, that is, the distribution G satisfying Prv∼G [v ≥ p] = 1/p for every p ≥ 1.
We take F to be the equal revenue distribution, truncated at v = 10 so that all of the mass
of the equal revenue distribution G at values ≥ 10 is uniformly respread in F throughout a small
interval [10, 10 + ε]. The corresponding revenue curve (in quantile space) r(q) = rF (q) climbs up
almost linearly (with a very slight convex curvature, which tends to linear as ε grows small) from
q = 0 (revenue 0) until q = 0.1 (revenue 1), and continues at revenue 1 from that point (i.e., for all
quantiles q > 0.1). For simplicity, we will perform our calculations by approximating the slightly
curved convex climb of r(q) in [0, 0.1] be a linear climb (conceptually corresponding to ε tending
to zero), that is:
r(q) =
{
10 · q q ≤ 0.1,
1 otherwise.
It is easy (and standard) to see that this approximation will have a negligible effect on our cal-
culations of ERM (F, 2) and ERM (F, 1), as its effect, for any quantile q, on either r(q) or v(q) is
negligible. For this to indeed hold, in the definition of e2 when defining the quantile chosen by the
arg min operator, we will henceforth break ties between q1, q2 that have v(q1) = v(q2) (such distinct
q1, q2 can only occur in the initial linear climb of the revenue curve) in favor of larger quantiles
(that is, higher revenue), as in the slightly curved initial convex climb of the revenue curve that is
approximated by this linear climb, the value of a larger quantile is slightly smaller that that of a
smaller quantile.
We start by precisely calculating the expected revenue from posting a price computed by ERM
given one sample:
ERM (F, 1) =
∫ 1
0
r(q) dq = 1− 0.1
2
= 19/20 = 0.95.
To calculate the expected revenue from posting a price computed by ERM given two samples, we
note that the revenue will be nonoptimal (i.e., less than 1) in precisely the following two cases:
• Both samples are from a quantile < 0.1. The expected revenue, conditioned on this case,
is Eq1,q2∼U([0,0.1])2 [max{10 · q1, 10 · q2}] = 2/3.
• One sample is from a quantile q1 < 0.1 and the other is from a quantile q2 > 0.2 In this
case, since v(q1) ≥ 10 = 2 · 5 = 2 · v(0.2) > 2 · v(q2), the price calculated by ERM
given these two samples is v(q1), and so the expected revenue, conditioned on this case,
is Eq1∼U([0,0.1]) [10 · q1] = 1/2.
Therefore, the expected revenue from posting a price computed by ERM given two samples is:
ERM (F, 2) =
1− 0.12 · (1− Eq1,q2∼U([0,0.1])2 [max{10q1, 10q2}])− 2 · 0.1 · 0.8 · (1− Eq1∼U([0,0.1]) [10q1]) =
= 1− 0.12 · 1/3− 2 · 0.1 · 0.8 · 1/2 = 11/12 = 0.916¯.
And so, indeed, ERM (F, 2) = 11/12 < 19/20 = ERM (F, 1), as required.
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Proposition 2. There exist regular distributions F and G such that ERM (F, 1) > ERM (G, 1) and
ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2).
Proof. An intuitive strategy for proving Proposition 2 is as follows: recall from the proof of Dhang-
watnotai et al. (2015) of Theorem 2 that for distributions with “triangular” revenue curves, the
expected revenue from posting a price computed by ERM given one sample, is precisely one half
of optimal, since the area beneath the revenue curve is precisely one half of the maximum value
of this curve. Nonetheless, when posting a price computed by ERM given two samples, it is not
hard to observe that different triangular revenue curves result in different expected revenues. So,
we will take F and G to be two distributions corresponding to triangular revenue curves with
OPT (F ) = OPT (G), such that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2). Since both revenue curves are triangu-
lar, we have that ERM (F, 1) = ERM (G, 1). By slightly perturbing the revenue curve of F in a way
that increases the area under this curve (causing ERM (F, 1) to increase) while only slightly chang-
ing ERM (F, 2), we obtain that for this perturbed F it still holds that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2),
but at the same time it also holds that ERM (F, 1) > ERM (G, 1), as required. We omit the full
details as Proposition 2 also follows from Proposition 3, whose more subtle proof we give below.
Recall from the proof of Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) for the single-sample case, that for any
distribution F , the expected revenue ERM (F, 1) is the integral of the revenue curve rF (·) with
respect to the uniform measure over quantiles. In the case of two samples, ERM (F, 2) can still
be expressed as an appropriate integral of the revenue curse rF (·), with two main caveats: first,
since two samples are involved, this integral is no longer with respect to the uniform measure
on quantiles, and second, since the probability of using the price that corresponds to a certain
quantile, i.e., the probability that ERM given two samples chooses this price, in fact depends in
quite a delicate manner on the distribution F through the value function vF (·), the measure with
respect to which this integral is defined is itself intricately dependent on the distribution F . To
drive this point home, we present the following surprising observation:
Proposition 3. There exist two regular distributions F and G with rF (q) > rG(q) for all
8 q ∈ (0, 1)
(so
∫
rF (q) >
∫
rG(q) with respect to any measure), such that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2).
Proof of Proposition 3. We will choose distributions F and G for which OPT (F ) = OPT (G) = 1.
We take G to be the distribution function corresponding to the “triangular” revenue curve rG(q) = q
and take F to be the distribution function corresponding to the following “quadrilateral” revenue
curve, which is obtained from rG by adding a slight “bump” (while maintaining convexity) at
q = 0.1 (see Figure 1):
rF (q) =
{
2.2 · q q ≤ 0.1
1− 0.78 · 1−q0.9 otherwise.
By construction ERM (F, 1) =
∫
rF (q) dq >
∫
rG(q) dq = ERM (G, 1). It remains to show that
ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2).9
We start with G (which corresponds to the uniform distribution over [1, 1 + ε] for negligible
epsilon). By a simple calculation we have for one sample that ERM (G, 1) = 1/2 and for two samples
that ERM (G, 2) = Eq1,q2∈U([0,1])
[
max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}]
= 2/3. We now move on to F ; the intuition
behind our construction is that by adding the “bump” at 0.1, while we do increase revenue by
8Equivalently, F first-order stochastically dominates G.
9As in our proof of Proposition 1, in order to avoid atoms in F and in G, we uniformly spread the mass of the
atom at the highest value v in the support of each distribution throughout the interval [v, v + ε], corresponds to
replacing the first linear climb in each of their revenue curves with a slightly curved convex climb.
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0 0.1 t ≈ 0.571 10
0.22
1
Figure 1: The revenue curves rF (blue) and rG (green) corresponding to the distributions F and
G from Proposition 3. The quantile t is the one that satisfies 2 · vF (t) = vF (0.22); that is, t is the
q-coordinate of the intersection point of rF and the ray from (0, 0) with slope exactly half that of
the ray from (0, 0) to (0.1, 0.22).
slightly raising max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}
above 2/3, we in fact decrease the revenue by “confusing” the
ERM algorithm and causing it to choose the higher price of the two samples, which corresponds
to the lower revenue min
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}
, in some cases, such as whenever the quantile of one of
the samples is below 0.1 and the quantile of the other is above t ≈ 0.571 (since in this case
v
(
min{q1, q2}
)
> 2 · v(max{q1, q2})). As it turns out, the latter effect dominates the former
one, causing an overall decrease in expected revenue compared to that of F . In Appendix A.1,
we calculate and show that indeed ERM (F, 2) < 0.651 < ERM (G, 2), thereby completing the
proof.
4 Main Result
In this section, we phrase and prove our main result.
Theorem 3. For every regular distribution F , we have that ERM (F, 2) > 0.509 ·OPT(F ).
Theorem 3 is the first part of Theorem 1 from the introduction. Combining Theorem 3 with
Theorem 2, we obtain our main monotonicity result (the second part of Theorem 1 from the
introduction).
Corollary 1. infregular F
ERM (F,2)
OPT (F ) > infregular F
ERM (F,1)
OPT (F ) .
As noted in the introduction, proving Theorem 3 turns out to be considerably more technically
challenging than may have been expected. One hint as to why was already given in Proposition 3.
To prove Theorem 3, we lower-bound the integral that defines ERM (F, 2) by estimating it over
three domains: first, we estimate this integral conditioned upon the two samples corresponding
to prices lower than the ideal posted price; second, we estimate this integral condition upon the
two samples corresponding to prices higher than the ideal posted price; and finally, we estimate
this integral conditioned upon the two samples falling on opposite sides of the ideal posted price.
Estimating each of these integrals is quite involved. For the first two domains, we manage to show
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that ERM guarantees quantifiably more than one half of the optimal revenue, while unfortunately
for the third domain, we do not manage to show that ERM guarantees even half of the optimal
revenue, forcing us to estimate the integral for the first two domains tightly enough to enable us to
argue that the losses in this third domain could be charged to the gains in the first two domains.
To balance the charging argument, we must utilize quite a few observations in each domain, and
furthermore estimate the integral in the first and last domains functions of the quantile of the ideal
price. Putting all of these together, we manage to show an overall guarantee of at least 0.509 of
OPT (F ) — quite close to one half, but nonetheless strictly bounded away from one half (and still
greater by orders of magnitude than the guarantee of (0.5 + 5 × 10−9) · OPT (F ) that Fu et al.
(2015) show for their randomized mechanism for one sample).
One possible way to approach Theorem 3 (and more generally, Open Problem 1) could have been
to try and identify the worst-case distributions for 2 samples (and more generally, for n samples),
i.e., distributions F for which ERM (F,2)OPT(F ) (and more generally,
ERM (F,n)
OPT(F ) ) is smallest, and then to
calculate this fraction for such distributions F . Indeed, recall that this is how Dhangwatnotai
et al. (2015) have proved Theorem 2: they have identified the distributions with triangular revenue
curves as the worst-case distributions for one sample, and showed that for these distributions this
fraction equals one half. Unfortunately, following this path, even for two samples, turns out quite
elusive. In this vain, hoping that some distribution with a triangular revenue curve continues
to be a worst-case distribution, Huang, Mansour, and Roughgarden (personal communication,
2015) have identified the single distribution with triangular revenue curve for which this fraction is
smallest among all distributions with triangular revenue curves, and have calculated this fraction
for this distribution (incidentally, it turns out to be considerably higher than our lower bound
from Theorem 3). Unfortunately, in light of our proof of Proposition 3, it seems that one can
show that for some distribution with a quadrilateral revenue curve (created, similarly to the proof
of Proposition 3, by adding a small “bump” to the “left edge” of the triangular revenue curve
identified by Huang, Mansour, and Roughgarden), this fraction turns out to be smaller than for
the distribution identified by Huang, Mansour, and Roughgarden, and hence we conclude that no
distribution with a triangular revenue curve is a worst-case distribution for ERM for two samples.
As we do not know how to identify the worst-case distributions for ERM, even for two samples,
our analysis must bound the fraction ERM (F,2)OPT(F ) for arbitrary regular distributions.
In the remainder of this section, we survey the high-level ideas behind the proof of Theorem 3,
whose full proof is given in Sections 5 through 7, with some calculations relegated to Appendix A.
Formally, we partition the set of pairs of quantiles as follows:
Definition 2 (L; R; B). For a regular distribution F with revenue curve r, we define10 q∗ ,
arg maxq∈[0,1] r(q) and partition [0, 1]2 into three sets:
1. R ,
{
(q1, q2) ∈ [0, 1]2
∣∣ min{q1, q2} ≥ q∗},
2. L ,
{
(q1, q2) ∈ [0, 1]2
∣∣ max{q1, q2} < q∗}, and
3. B , [0, 1]2 \ (L ∪R).
To prove Theorem 3, we will lower-bound the expected revenue of a price chosen by the ERM
algorithm given two samples, conditioned upon these two samples belonging to each of the sets R,
L, and B.
10In case of multiple revenue-maximizing quantiles, we may pick q∗ arbitrarily among them.
10
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OPT (F )
Figure 2: Pictorial definition of t(q) from the proof of Lemma 2. When r is continuous with
r(1) = 0, then t(q) is the q-coordinate of the intersection point of r and the ray from (0, 0) with
slope exactly half that of the ray from (0, 0) to
(
q, r(q)
)
.
4.1 Both Samples Below the Ideal Price (R)
In Section 5, we lower-bound the expected revenue, conditioned upon both samples being lower
than the ideal price q∗:
Lemma 2. For every regular F ,
E(q1,q2)∼U(R) [e2(q1, q2)] ≥

(
1
3
− 1
4(1− q∗) −
1
2(1− q∗)2 −
log q∗
2(1− q∗)3
)
·OPT(F ) q∗≥2/3,(
2
3
− 1
(1− q∗)3
(
2
9
−
(q∗
4
)2
+
1
3
(q∗
2
)3
+
log 2/3
2
))
·OPT(F ) q∗<2/3.
As noted above, it would not have sufficed to simply bound the expectation on the left-hand
side of the above inequality away from one half of OPT, as we will have to charge the losses below
one-half-of-OPT of our lower bound for the case where the quantiles are in B (given in Lemma 4
below), which depend on q∗, to the gains above one-half-of-OPT from Lemma 2 (and from Lemma 3
below). To prove Lemma 2, we first lower-bound, for each possible quantile q, the expected revenue
of the price computed by ERM conditioned upon min{q1, q2} = q. Recall that since both quantiles
are in R, we have that q is the quantile of the “better” sample, with higher expected revenue.
Denoting by t(q) the threshold value of max{q1, q2} (see Figure 2) so that the ERM algorithm
chooses the price that corresponds to quantile q (the price that attains better expected revenue
among the two samples), it turns out that we are in a win-win situation: if t(q) is “close” to q, then
conditioned upon min{q1, q2} = q, there is a high probability that the higher quantile lies above
t(q), causing the “better” sample (with quantile q) to be chosen; conversely, the farther t(q) is from
q, the larger r
(
t(q)
)
is, i.e., the revenue curve r decreases quite moderately between q∗ and t(q),
and so even when the “worse” sample is chosen, the revenue is still reasonably high. The full proof
of Lemma 2 is given in Section 5, with some calculations relegated to Appendix A.2.
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4.2 Both Samples Above the Ideal Price (L)
In Section 6, we lower-bound the expected revenue, conditioned upon both samples being higher
than the ideal price q∗:
Lemma 3. For every regular F ,
E(q1,q2)∼U(L) [e2(q1, q2)] ≥ 0.528 ·OPT(F ).
To survey the proof of Lemma 3, we define:
• EL2 (r) = E(q1,q2)∼U(L) [e2(q1, q2)] — the expected revenue of ERM,
• ML2 (r) = E(q1,q2)∼U(L)
[
max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}]
— the expected revenue had we always picked the
“better” sample (the sample with higher expected revenue).
The proof of Lemma 3 is based on a coupling of EL2 and M
L
2 , giving that
• EL2 (r) ≥ 34 ·ML2 (r), with equality if and only if r is constant11.
The proof of this inequality is similar to the proof of Lemma 2, and is achieved by lower-bounding,
for each possible quantile q, the expected revenue of the price computed by ERM conditioned upon
max{q1, q2} = q. Recall that since both quantiles are in L, we have that q is the quantile of the
“better” sample, with higher expected revenue. Denoting by t(q) the threshold value of min{q1, q2}
(see Figure 3) so that the ERM algorithm chooses the price that corresponds to quantile q (the
price that attains better expected revenue among the two samples), we show that we are once again
in a win-win situation: if t(q) is “close” to q, then conditioned upon max{q1, q2} = q, there is a high
probability that the lower quantile lies below t(q), causing the “better” sample (with quantile q)
to be chosen; conversely, the farther t(q) is from q, the larger r
(
t(q)
)
is, i.e., the revenue curve r
decreases quite moderately between q∗ and t(q), and so even when the “worse” sample is chosen,
the revenue is still reasonably close to that of the “better” sample.
Unlike in the proof of Lemma 2, the proof of Lemma 3 requires some additional case-analysis
beyond this point. A simple calculation shows that
• ML2 (r) ≥ 23 ·OPT(r), with equality if and only if r is linear12.
The observations in the two “bullets” above lead to the following win-win situation:
• Either r is “far from linear”, and then ML2 (r) >
(
2
3 + ε
) ·OPT (r), giving
EL2 (r) ≥ 34 ·ML2 (r) > 34 ·
(
2
3 + ε
) ·OPT (r) > 12 ·OPT (r),
• or r is “far from constant”, and then EL2 (r) ≥
(
3
4 + ε
) ·ML2 (r), giving
EL2 (r) ≥
(
3
4 + ε
) ·ML2 (r) > (34 + ε) · 23 ·OPT (r) > 12 ·OPT (r).
The full proof of Lemma 3 is given in Section 6, with some calculations relegated to Ap-
pendix A.3.
11That is, ∀q : r(q) = OPT(r).
12That is, ∃m > 0, so that ∀q : r(q) = m · q.
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0 t(q) q q∗
0
OPT (F )
Figure 3: Pictorial definition of t from the proof of Lemma 3. t(q) is the q-coordinate of the
rightmost intersection point of r and the ray from (0, 0) with slope exactly twice that of the ray
from (0, 0) to
(
q, r(q)
)
.
4.3 One Sample on Each Side of the Ideal Price (B)
In Section 7, we lower-bound the expected revenue, conditioned upon one of the two samples being
lower than the ideal price q∗ and the other being higher than the ideal price q∗:
Lemma 4. For every regular F ,
E(q1,q2)∼U(B) [e2(q1, q2)] ≥
1
2
·
(
1−
(
q∗
2 · (1 + q∗)
)2)
·OPT(F ).
As already mentioned above, whenever q∗ > 0, the right-hand side of the above inequality
(which deteriorates as q∗ grows) is strictly less than the one-half-of-OPT(F ) guarantee of ERM
given one sample, so when proving Theorem 3 we will have to charge this loss to the gains over
one-half-of-OPT(F ) that we obtained in the lower bounds of Lemmas 2 and 3. The correctness of
Lemma 4 follows from the following sublemma.
Sublemma 4. Let m ∈ [0, 1], let T : [0, 1] → [m, 1] be a monotone nonincreasing function, and
for every i ∈ {1, 2} let ri : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a monotone nondecreasing and concave function s.t.
ri(x) ≥ x for every x ∈ [0, 1]. For every (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2, define G(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
G(x, y) ,
{
r2(y) r2(y) ≥ T (x),
r1(x) otherwise.
Then E(x,y)∼U([0,1]2) [G(x, y)] ≥ 1+m2 − 1/2 · (1+m2 )2.
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0 x · q∗ q∗ 10
OPT (F )
T (x)
(a) Pictorial definition of T from the proof of Lemma 4.
When r is continuous with r(1) = 0, then T (x) is the
y-coordinate of the intersection point of r and the ray
from (0, 0) with slope exactly half that of the ray from
(0, 0) to
(
x · q∗, r(x · q∗)
)
.
0 q∗ 1
0
OPT (F )
T (1)m
(b) Pictorial definition of m from the proof of Lemma 4.
Concavity of r implies that the graph of the decreasing
part of r must be completely contained in the shaded
region. m is the smallest possible value of T (1) (which is
attained when r is the smallest possible within the shaded
region).
Figure 4: Reduction from Lemma 4 to Sublemma 4.
The proof of Sublemma 4 is given in Section 7. We will now show how Lemma 4 indeed follows
from this sublemma.
Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 1, we may assume without loss of generality that OPT(r) = 1. By
symmetry of e2, it is enough to prove the claim w.r.t. (q1, q2) ∼ B1, where B1 , {(q1, q2) ∈ B |
q1 < q2}. We define:
• r1 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by x 7→ r(x · q∗),
• r2 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by y 7→ r
(
1− y · (1− q∗)
)
,
• T : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by x 7→ r (inf{q ≥ q∗ ∣∣ v(x · q∗) ≥ 2v(q)}). (See Figure 4(a).)
We notice that under these definitions, we have (where G(x, y) is defined as in Sublemma 4) that
E(q1,q2)∼U(B1) [e2(x, y)] = E(x,y)∼U([0,1]2) [G(x, y)] .
We note that the lower-bound that we obtain by applying Sublemma 4, as is, to the above
definitions of r1, r2, T , is 3/8, which for q∗ < 1 is worse than the guarantee that we are attempting
to prove in Lemma 4. The main idea that drives our improved revenue guarantee in Lemma 4 is to
bound m, the minimum value attained by T , away from 0. Since the intersection of y = x2q∗ (the
line defined by the points (0, 0) and (q∗, 1/2)) and y = 1− x−q∗1−q∗ (the line defined by the points (q∗, 1)
and (1, 0)) is ( 2q∗1+q∗ ,
1
1+q∗ ), then defining m ,
1
1+q∗ , we note that by monotonicity and convexity of
r|[q∗,1] and since r(q∗) = 1, the range of T is in fact [m, 1]. (See Figure 4(b).)
Applying Sublemma 4 with this value of m, we obtain that
E(q1,q2)∼U(B1) [e2(x, y)] = E(x,y)∼U([0,1]2) [G(x, y)] ≥
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1 +m
2
− 1
2
·
(
1 +m
2
)2
=
1
2
(
1−
(
q∗
2(1 + q∗)
)2)
,
as required. The calculation justifying the last equality is detailed in Appendix A.4.
4.4 Completing the Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 follows from combining Lemmas 2 through 4.
Proof of Theorem 3. By definition,
ERM (F, 2) = (1− q∗)2 · E(q1,q2)∼U(R) [e2(q1, q2)] + q2∗ · E(q1,q2)∼U(L) [e2(q1, q2)] +
2q∗(1− q∗) · E(q1,q2)∼U(B) [e2(q1, q2)] .
In Appendix A.5, we substitute the respective lower bounds from Lemmas 2 through 4 for each of
the above summands, and calculate and show that indeed ERM (F, 2) > 0.509 · OPT(F ), thereby
completing the proof of Theorem 3.
5 Both Samples Below the Ideal Price (R): Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, we may assume without loss of generality that OPT(r) = 1. We
define:
ER2 (r) = E(q1,q2)∼U(R) [e2(q1, q2)] .
Let (q1, q2) ∼ U
(
[q∗, 1]2
)
. The random variable min{q1, q2} has density function µ(q) = 2 1−q(1−q∗)2
(see Lemma 5 in Appendix B). For q ∈ [q∗, 1], define
ER2 (r|q) , E [e2(q1, q2) | min{q1, q2}=q] .
Note that
ER2 (r) = Eq∼µ
[
ER2 (r|q)
]
.
Let q ∈ [0, 1]. Conditioned13 on min{q1, q2} = q, we have that e2(q1, q2) is equal to r(q) =
max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}
exactly when 2v
(
max{q1, q2}
) ≤ v(q). Thus, we define t(q) as the threshold
value that determines when e2(q1, q2) = r(q) = max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}
.
Definition 3 (t(x); see Figure 2 on Page 11). For q ∈ [q∗, 1], we define
t(q) , sup {x ≥ q | 2v(x) > v(q)} .
For q = 1, define t(1) , 1, and when q∗ = 0, define t(0) , 0.
It is not hard to verify the following properties of the function t(q).
Sublemma 5 (Properties of t).
1. e2(q1, q2) = max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}
if and only if max{q1, q2} ≥ t
(
min{q1, q2}
)
.
2. For all q: t(q) ∈ [q, 2q] (due to monotonicity of r).
13This event has 0 probability. However, since the pair
(
min{q1, q2},max{q1, q2}
)
has an appropriate joint density
function, this conditioning is meaningful.
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3. t is monotone nondecreasing (due to monotonicity of v).
4. t is continuous (due to continuity of r).
5. v(t(q)) = v(q)2 , whenever t(q) 6= 0.
The following lemma relates ER2 (r|q) with r(q), which is the expected revenue obtained by
always choosing the “better” sample when min{q1, q2} = q.
Sublemma 6. For all q:
ER2 (r|q) ≥
r(q)
1− q
(
t(q)2
4q
− 3
4
t(q) + 1− q
2
)
.
Proof. Conditioned on min{q1, q2} = q, the random variable x , max{q1, q2} is distributed uni-
formly in [q, 1]. Thus,
ER2 (r|q) = Pr [x ≥ t(q)] · r(q) + Pr [x < t(q)] · Ex
[
r(x)
∣∣∣ q ≤ x < t(q)]
≥ Pr [x ≥ t(q)] · r(q) + Pr [x < t(q)] ·
(
r
(
t(q)
)
+ r(q)
2
)
(by concavity of r)
= Pr [x ≥ t(q)] · r(q) + Pr [x < t(q)] ·
 t(q)2q r(q) + r(q)
2

(by Sublemma 5(5):
r
(
t(q)
)
t(q) = v
(
t(q)
)
= v(q)2 =
r(q)
2q )
=
(
1− t(q)
1− q
)
· r(q) +
(
t(q)− q
1− q
)
·
 t(q)2q r(q) + r(q)
2

=
r(q)
1− q
(
t(q)2
4q
− 3
4
t(q) + 1− q
2
)
.
Sublemma 7. For every q ∈ [0, 1]:
ER2 (r|q) ≥
r(q)
(
1− 116 · q1−q
)
q ≤ 2/3,
r(q)
(
1
2 +
1
4q
)
q > 2/3.
Proof. By Sublemma 6,
ER2 (r|q) ≥
r(q)
1− qPq
(
t(q)
)
.
Where Pq(x) , x
2
4q − 34x + 1 − q2 is a quadratic polynomial with minimum at xmin , 32q. Since
t(q) ≤ 1, it follows that
Pq
(
t(q)
) ≥ {Pq(32q) 32q ≤ 1,
Pq(1)
3
2q > 1.
Now, 32q ≤ 1 if and only if q ≤ 23 . The conclusion follows since
r(q)
1− qPq
(
3
2q
)
= r(q)
(
1− 1
16
· q
1− q
)
, and
r(q)
1− qPq (1) = r(q)
(
1
2
+
1
4q
)
.
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With Sublemma 7 in hand, we are ready to finish the proof of Lemma 2. We will use the
following simple fact that follows from the concavity of r:
∀q ∈ [q∗, 1]: r(q) ≥ 1− q
1− q∗ ; (1)
indeed, `(q) = 1−q1−q∗ is an affine function satisfying `(q∗) = 1 = r(q∗), and `(1) = 0 ≤ r(1).
In Appendix A.2, we use Sublemma 7 and Equation (1) to calculate and show that indeed ER2 (r)
is lower-bounded as in the statement of Lemma 2, thereby completing the proof of this lemma.
6 Both Samples Above the Ideal Price (L): Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. When proving Lemma 2, we had no choice but to carry on the dependence
on q∗ throughout the proof. Luckily, in the case where both samples are above the ideal price, we
may normalize q∗ to equal 1 without loss of generality. Indeed, the resulting distribution has all
values multiplied by q∗ (similarly to the proof of Lemma 1), and so the choice of ERM between the
values corresponding to any two quantiles is unchanged. Furthermore, as before, by Lemma 1 we
may assume without loss of generality that OPT(r) = 1.
We begin by coupling ML2 and E
L
2 . Let (q1, q2) ∼ U
(
[0, 1]2
)
. The random variable max{q1, q2}
has density function µ(q) = 2q (see Lemma 6(1) in Appendix B). For q ∈ [0, 1], define
EL2 (r|q) , E [e2(q1, q2) | max{q1, q2}=q] ,
ML2 (r|q) , E
[
max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
} | max{q1, q2}=q] = r(q).
Note that
EL2 (r) = Eq∼µ
[
EL2 (r|q)
]
,
ML2 (r) = Eq∼µ
[
ML2 (r|q)
]
.
Next, we relate EL2 (r|q) withML2 (r|q). Let q ∈ [0, 1]. Conditioned on max{q1, q2} = q,14 we have
that e2(q1, q2) is equal to r(q) = max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}
exactly when v
(
min{q1, q2}
)
< 2v(q). Thus, we
define t(q) as the threshold value that determines when e2(q1, q2) = r(q) = max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}
.
Definition 4 (t(x); see Figure 3 on Page 13). For q ∈ [0, 1], we define
t(q) , inf
{
x ≤ q ∣∣ v(x) ≥ 2v(q)}.
If q = 0 or
{
x
∣∣ v(x) ≥ 2v(q)} = ∅, then we define t(q) , 0.
It is not hard to verify the following properties of the function t(q).
Sublemma 8 (Properties of t).
1. e2(q1, q2) = max
{
r(q1), r(q2)
}
if and only if min{q1, q2} ≥ t
(
max{q1, q2}
)
.
2. For all q: t(q) ≤ q2 (due to monotonicity of r).
3. t is monotone nondecreasing (due to monotonicity of v).
14Similarly to Section 5, this event has 0 probability. However, since the pair
(
min{q1, q2},max{q1, q2}
)
has an
appropriate joint density function, this conditioning is meaningful.
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4. t is continuous (due to continuity of r).
5. v(t(q)) = 2v(q), whenever t(q) 6= 0.
The following sublemma relates ML2 (r|q) and EL2 (r|q).
Sublemma 9. For all q:
EL2 (r|q) ≥ r(q) ·
((
t
q
)2
− t
q
+ 1
)
.
Proof. Conditioned on max{q1, q2} = q, the random variable x , min{q1, q2} is distributed uni-
formly in [0, q]. Thus,
EL2 (r|q) = Pr [x ≥ t] · r(q) + Pr [x < t] · Ex∼U([0,1]) [r(x) | x < t]
≥ Pr [x ≥ t] · r(q) + Pr [x < t] · Ex∼U([0,1])
[
r(t)
t
x
∣∣∣∣ x < t]
(by concavity, ∀x ≤ t : r(x)x ≥ r(t)t )
= Pr [x ≥ t] · r(q) + Pr [x < t] · r(t)
2
= Pr [x ≥ t] · r(q) + Pr [x < t] · t
q
r(q)
(by Sublemma 8(5), ∀q : r(t)t = v(t) = 2v(q) = 2 r(q)q )
=
q − t
q
· r(q) + t
q
· t
q
r(q)
= r(q) ·
((
t
q
)2
− t
q
+ 1
)
.
Since for every y the value of the polynomial y2 − y + 1 is at least 34 , we obtain the following
sublemma:
Sublemma 10. For every q ∈ [0, 1]: EL2 (r|q) ≥ 34r(q) = 34ML2 (r|q).
We next quantify the distinction between revenue curves r that are “close” to constant, and
revenue curves r that are “close” to linear. To this end, fix some δ ∈ [0, 1] that we will later pick
in a way that maximizes the revenue. We distinguish between two types of revenue curves r:15
1. r satisfies r(1/2) ≥ (1 + δ) · 1/2 (r is “far” from linear).
2. r satisfies r(1/2) < (1 + δ) · 1/2 (r is “far” from constant).
Sublemma 11 (The Case in which r is “Far from Linear”). If r satisfies r(1/2) ≥ (1 + δ) · 1/2, then
ML2 (r) ≥
2
3
+
δ
4
.
15It is possible also to optimize over “1/2” in this partition of revenue curves, that is, for some carefully chosen
qm, δ ∈ [0, 1], to distinguish between revenue curves r satisfying r(qm) ≥ (1 + δ) · qm and revenue curves r satisfying
r(qm) < (1 + δ) · qm. While this does give a slightly improved lower bound, we avoid doing as it would add even more
details to the analysis.
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Proof. Let `1(q) be the affine function that satisfies `1(0) = 0 and `1(1/2) = (1 + δ) · 1/2, and let
`2(q) be the affine function that satisfies `2(1/2) = (1 + δ) · 1/2 and `2(1) = 1. By concavity of r and
since r(1) = 1,
r(q) ≥
{
`1(q) q ∈ [0, 12 ],
`2(q) q ∈ [12 , 1].
Therefore,
ML2 (r) = Eq∼µ
[
ML2 (r|q)
]
= Eq∼µ [r(q)]
= Pr [q ≤ 1/2] · Eq [r(q) | q ≤ 1/2] + Pr [q > 1/2] · Eq [r(q) | q > 1/2]
≥ Pr [q ≤ 1/2] · Eq [`1(q) | q ≤ 1/2] + Pr [q > 1/2] · Eq [`2(q) | q > 1/2]
= Pr [q ≤ 1/2] · `1
(
Eq [q | q ≤ 1/2]
)
+ Pr [q > 1/2] · `2
(
Eq [q | q > 1/2]
)
(by linearity of expectation)
= 1/4 · `1(1/3) + 3/4 · `2(7/9) (by Lemma 6(2,3) in Appendix B)
=
1 + δ
12
+
21 + 6δ
36
=
2
3
+
δ
4
.
Combining Sublemmas 10 and 11 yields:
Sublemma 12. If r satisfies r(1/2) ≥ (1 + δ) · 1/2, then
EL2 (r) ≥
1
2
+
3δ
16
.
Sublemma 13 (The Case in which r is “Far from Constant”). If r satisfies r(1/2) < (1 + δ) · 1/2,
then
EL2 (r) ≥
64
3
γ5 − 8γ4 + 8
3
γ3 − 2
3
γ2 − γ + 2
3
,
where γ , δ1+δ . (See Figure 5.)
Proof. We first show that
∀q : t(q) ≤ min{q/2, γ}.
That t(q) ≤ q2 follows from Sublemma 8(2). To see that t(q) ≤ γ for all q, it suffices to show
that t(1) ≤ γ (since t(q) is monotone nondecreasing by Sublemma 8(3)). Since r(1) = 1, we have
v(1) = 1, and so by Sublemma 8(5), t(1) is the q-coordinate of the intersection point of the line
y = 2q and r(q). Let `(q) be the affine function that satisfies `(1/2) = (1 + δ) · 1/2 and `(1) = 1.
By concavity of r, for all q ∈ [0, 1/2], r(q) ≤ `(q). Therefore, since by Sublemma 8(2), t(1) ≤ 1/2, it
follows that t(1) is at most the q-coordinate of the intersection point of the lines y = 2q, and `(q).
A simple calculation shows that the latter q-coordinate is δ1+δ = γ, and so t(1) ≤ γ. (See Figure 5.)
Therefore, we have shown that
∀q : t(q) ≤ min{q/2, γ},
as required.
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0 t(1) γ 1/2 q∗ = 1
0
1/2
1/2 · (1 + δ)
OPT (F ) = 1
Figure 5: Pictorial definition of γ from Sublemma 13. The assumption that r(1/2) < (1 + δ) · 1/2
implies that the graph of r restricted to [0, 1/2] must be completely contained in the shaded region.
γ is the largest possible value of t(1) (which is attained when r is the largest possible within the
shaded region).
Therefore, by Sublemma 9,
EL2 (r) ≥ Eq
[((
t
q
)2
− t
q
+ 1
)
· r(q)
]
(2)
≥ Eq
[((
t
q
)2
− t
q
+ 1
)
· q
]
(by concavity and since r(1)=1, ∀q : r(q) ≥ q)
≥ Pr [q ≤ 2γ] · Eq
[
3
4q
∣∣ q ≤ 2γ]+ Pr [q > 2γ] · Eq [((γ
q
)2
− γ
q
+ 1
)
· q
∣∣∣∣∣ q > 2γ
]
.
(since when q > 2γ, we have tq ≤ γq < 12 , and since y2 − y + 1 is decreasing in [0, 12 ])
In Appendix A.3, we calculate and show that the left-hand side of Equation (2) is lower-bounded
by the right-hand side of the inequality in the statement of Sublemma 13, thereby completing the
proof of this sublemma.
With Sublemmas 12 and 13 in hand, the proof of Lemma 3 follows; indeed, taking δ , 0.15117
yields min
{
1
2 +
3δ
16 ,
64
3 γ
5 − 8γ4 + 83γ3 − 23γ2 − γ + 23
} ≈ 0.528344 and therefore
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For every nondecreasing regular r, EL2 (r) ≥ 0.528 ·OPT(r).
which concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
7 One Sample on Each Side of the Ideal Price (B): Proof of
Lemma 4
We complete the proof of Lemma 4 by proving Sublemma 4, from which we have shown above that
Lemma 4 follows.
Proof of Sublemma 4. Let Mˆ , Ey∼U([0,1]) [r2(y) | r2(y)≥m] and p2 , Pry∼U([0,1]) [r2(y)<m]. We
first claim that for every x ∈ [0, 1],
Ey∼U([0,1]) [G(x, y)] ≥
{
r1(x) r1(x) ≤ Mˆ,
p2 · r1(x) + (1− p2) · Mˆ otherwise.
(3)
To prove Equation (3), for every x ∈ [0, 1] we first put M(x) , Ey∼U([0,1]) [r2(y) | r2(y)≥T (x)].
We note that since M(x) is increasing in T (x), we have that M(x) ≥ Mˆ . We now fix x ∈ [0, 1]. By
definition and since M(x) ≥ Mˆ , we have that
Ey∼U([0,1]) [G(x, y)] = Pr [r2(y)<T (x)] · r1(x) + Pr [r2(y)≥T (x)] ·M(x) ≥
≥ Pr [r2(y)<T (x)] · r1(x) + Pr [r2(y)≥T (x)] · Mˆ.
For the first part of Equation (3), note that if r1(x) ≤ Mˆ , then
Ey∼U([0,1]) [G(x, y)] ≥ Pr [r2(y)<T (x)] · r1(x) + Pr [r2(y)≥T (x)] · Mˆ ≥
≥ Pr [r2(y)<T (x)] · r1(x) + Pr [r2(y)≥T (x)] · r1(x) = r1(x).
For the second part of Equation (3), note that if r1(x) > Mˆ , then for any convex combination of
r1(x) and Mˆ , increasing the relative weight of Mˆ can only reduce the total value of the convex
combination. Therefore,
Ey∼U([0,1]) [G(x, y)] ≥ Pr [r2(y)<T (x)] · r1(x) + Pr [r2(y)≥T (x)] · Mˆ ≥
≥ Pr [r2(y)<m] · r1(x) + Pr [r2(y)≥m] · Mˆ =
≥ p2 · r1(x) + (1− p2) · Mˆ,
concluding the proof of Equation (3).
Let p1 , Prx∼U([0,1])
[
r1(x)≤Mˆ
]
. By Equation (3), we have that
E(x,y)∼U([0,1]2) [G(x, y)] = Ex∼U([0,1])
[
Ey∼U([0,1]) [G(x, y)]
]
=
p1 · Ex
[
Ey [G(x, y)]
∣∣ r1(x) ≤ Mˆ]+ (1− p1) · Ex [Ey [G(x, y)] ∣∣ r1(x) > Mˆ] ≥
p1 · Ex
[
r1(x) | r1(x) ≤ Mˆ
]
+ (1− p1) ·
(
p2 · Ex
[
r1(x) | r1(x) > Mˆ
]
+ (1− p2) · Mˆ
)
≥
p1 · Mˆ/2 + (1− p1) ·
(
p2 · 1 + Mˆ
2
+ (1− p2) · Mˆ
)
, (4)
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where the last inequality is by monotonicity and concavity of r1 and since r1(1) = 1.
Since Mˆ ≤ 1, we have that Mˆ ≤ 1+Mˆ2 . By concavity of r1 and since r1(1) = 1, we note that
p1 ≤ Mˆ . By both of these and by Equation (4), we have that
E(x,y)∼U([0,1]2) [G(x, y)] ≥ p1 · Mˆ/2 + (1− p1) ·
(
p2 · 1 + Mˆ
2
+ (1− p2) · Mˆ
)
≥
≥ p1 · Mˆ/2 + (1− p1) · Mˆ ≥ Mˆ · Mˆ/2 + (1− Mˆ) · Mˆ = Mˆ − Mˆ2/2.
Finally, by monotonicity and concavity of r2 and since since r2(1) = 1, we have that Mˆ ≥ 1+m2 .
Noting that the function z − z2/2 is increasing in [0, 1], we therefore have that
E(x,y)∼U([0,1]2) [G(x, y)] ≥ Mˆ −
Mˆ2
2
≥ 1 +m
2
− 1
2
·
(
1 +m
2
)2
,
as required.
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A Omitted Calculations
A.1 Calculation Omitted from the Proof of Proposition 3
ERM (F, 2) < 0.12 · Eq1.q2∼U([0,0.1])2 [max{r(q1), r(q2)}] +
+ 0.92 · Eq1,q2∼U([0.1,1])2 [max{r(q1), r(q2)}] +
+ 2 · (t− 0.1) · 0.1 · Eq∼U([0.1,t]) [r(q)] +
+ 2 · 0.1 · (1− t) · Eq∼U([0,0.1]) [r(q)] =
= 0.12 · 2
3
· 0.22+
+ 0.92 · (0.22 + 2
3
· (1− 0.22))+
+ 2 · 0.1 · (t− 0.1) · (0.22 + 1
2
· (r(t)− 0.22))+
+ 2 · 0.1 · (1− t) · 1
2
· 0.22 <
< 0.651 < ERM (G, 2).
A.2 Calculation Omitted from the Proof of Lemma 2
Consider first the case in which q∗ ≥ 2/3.
ER2 (r) = Eq
[
ER2 (r|q)
]
≥ Eq
[
r(q)
(
1
2
+
1
4q
)]
(by Sublemma 7)
≥ Eq
[(
1− q
1− q∗
)(
1
2
+
1
4q
)]
(by Equation (1))
=
∫ 1
q∗
(
1− q
1− q∗
)(
1
2
+
1
4q
)(
2
1− q
(1− q∗)2
)
dq (by Lemma 5 in Appendix B)
=
∫ 1
q∗
(
1− q
1− q∗
)(
1
2
+
1
4
· 1
1− (1− q)
)(
2
1− q
(1− q∗)2
)
dq
=
∫ 1
q∗
(
1− q
1− q∗
)(
1
2
+
1
4
·
∞∑
n=0
(1− q)n
)(
2
1− q
(1− q∗)2
)
dq
=
1
(1− q∗)3
∫ 1
q∗
(1− q)
(
1 +
1
2
·
∞∑
n=0
(1− q)n
)
(1− q) dq
=
1
(1− q∗)3
∫ 1
q∗
(
(1− q)2 + 1
2
·
∞∑
n=0
(1− q)n+2
)
dq
24
=
1
(1− q∗)3
(
(1− q∗)3
3
+
1
2
·
∞∑
n=0
(1− q∗)n+3
n+ 3
)
=
1
3
+
1
2(1− q∗)3 ·
∞∑
n=3
(1− q∗)n
n
=
1
3
+
1
2(1− q∗)3 ·
( ∞∑
n=1
(1− q∗)n
n
− (1− q∗)
2
2
− (1− q∗)
)
=
1
3
− 1
4(1− q∗) −
1
2(1− q∗)2 −
log q∗
2(1− q∗)3 .
Now consider the case in which q∗ < 2/3.
ER2 (r) = Eq
[
ER2 (r|q)
]
=
∫ 1
q∗
ER2 (r|q) ·
(
2
1− q
(1− q∗)2
)
dq (by Lemma 5 in Appendix B)
≥
∫ 2/3
q∗
r(q)
(
1− 1
16
· q
1− q
)
·
(
2
1− q
(1− q∗)2
)
dq +
∫ 1
2/3
r(q)
(
1
2
+
1
4
· 1
q
)
·
(
2
1− q
(1− q∗)2
)
dq
(by Sublemma 7)
≥
∫ 2/3
q∗
(
1− q
1− q∗
)(
1− 1
16
· q
1− q
)
·
(
2
1− q
(1− q∗)2
)
dq+∫ 1
2/3
(
1− q
1− q∗
)(
1
2
+
1
4q
)
·
(
2
1− q
(1− q∗)2
)
dq (by Equation (1))
=
2
(1− q∗)3
∫ 2/3
q∗
(
1− q − q
16
)
· (1− q) dq + 1
(1− q∗)3
(
(1/3)3
3
+
1
2
·
∞∑
n=0
(1/3)n+3
n+ 3
)
(calculation of the second integral as in the case q∗ ≥ 2/3)
=
1
(1− q∗)3
(∫ 2/3
q∗
(
2− 33
8
q +
17
8
q2
)
dq +
(1/3)3
3
+
1
2
·
∞∑
n=3
(1/3)n
n
)
=
1
(1− q∗)3
(
2
(
2
3
− q∗
)
− 33
16
(
4
9
− q2∗
)
+
17
24
(
8
27
− q3∗
)
+
1
81
+
1
2
·
∞∑
n=3
(1/3)n
n
)
=
1
(1− q∗)3
(
2
3
(1− q∗)3 + 2
3
− 33
16
· 4
9
+
q2∗
16
+
17
24
· 8
27
− q
3∗
24
+
1
81
+
1
2
·
∞∑
n=3
(1/3)n
n
)
=
2
3
+
1
(1− q∗)3
(
2
3
− 33
16
· 4
9
+
17
24
· 8
27
+
1
81
+
q2∗
16
− q
3∗
24
+
1
2
·
∞∑
n=3
(1/3)n
n
)
=
2
3
+
1
(1− q∗)3
(
−1
36
+
q2∗
16
− q
3∗
24
+
1
2
·
∞∑
n=3
(1/3)n
n
)
=
2
3
− 1
(1− q∗)3
(
1
36
−
(q∗
4
)2
+
1
3
(q∗
2
)3 − 1
2
·
∞∑
n=3
(1/3)n
n
)
=
2
3
− 1
(1− q∗)3
(
1
36
−
(q∗
4
)2
+
1
3
(q∗
2
)3
+
1
2
log 2/3 +
1
2
· (1/3)
2
2
+
1
2
· 1/3
)
25
=
2
3
− 1
(1− q∗)3
(
2
9
−
(q∗
4
)2
+
1
3
(q∗
2
)3
+
log 2/3
2
)
.
A.3 Calculation Omitted from the Proof of Lemma 3
To evaluate the first expectation in Equation (2), we note that by Lemma 6(2) in Appendix B, we
have that Eq
[
3
4q
∣∣ q ≤ 2γ] = 34 · 23 · 2γ = γ. Evaluating the second expectation, we have
Eq
[((
γ
q
)2
− γ
q
+ 1
)
· q
∣∣∣∣∣ q > 2γ
]
=
∫ 1
2γ
((
γ
q
)2
− γ
q
+ 1
)
· q · 2q · dq =
= 2
∫ 1
2γ
(
γ2 − γq + q2) dq = 2(γ2q − γ q2
2
+
q3
3
)∣∣∣∣1
2γ
=
= 2
(
γ2 − γ
2
+
1
3
− 2γ3 + 2γ3 − 8
3
γ3
)
= −16
3
γ3 + 2γ2 − γ + 2
3
.
Plugging the expressions for these two expectations into Equation (2), we obtain
E2(e) ≥ 4γ2 · γ + (1− 4γ2) ·
(
−16
3
γ3 + 2γ2 − γ + 2
3
)
=
64
3
γ5 − 8γ4 + 8
3
γ3 − 2
3
γ2 − γ + 2
3
,
as required.
A.4 Calculation Omitted from the Proof of Lemma 4
E(q1,q2)∼U(B1) [e2(x, y)] = E(x,y)∼U([0,1]2) [G(x, y)] ≥
1 +m
2
− 1
2
·
(
1 +m
2
)2
=
2 + q∗
2(1 + q∗)
− (2 + q∗)
2
8(1 + q∗)2
=
1
2
+
1
2(1 + q∗)
− (2 + q∗)
2
8(1 + q∗)2
=
1
2
− 1
2
(
(2 + q∗)2 − 4(1 + q∗)
(2(1 + q∗))2
)
=
1
2
− 1
2
(
q2∗
(2(1 + q∗))2
)
=
1
2
(
1−
(
q∗
2(1 + q∗)
)2)
.
A.5 Calculation Omitted from the Proof of Theorem 3
By Lemma 1 assume w.l.o.g. that OPT(F ) = 1. We consider two cases based on the peak point q∗
of r.
If q∗ ≥ 23 , then by Lemmas 2 through 4, we have that
ERM (F, 2) ≥ (1− q∗)2 ·
(
1
3
− 1
4(1− q∗) −
1
2(1− q∗)2 −
log q∗
2(1− q∗)3
)
+
q2∗ · 0.528 + 2q∗(1− q∗) ·
1
2
(
1−
(
q∗
2 · (1 + q∗)
)2)
=
26
=(
1
3
(1− q∗)2 − 1
4
(1− q∗)− 1
2
− log q∗
2(1− q∗)
)
+
q2∗ · 0.528 + q∗(1− q∗)
(
1−
(
q∗
2 · (1 + q∗)
)2)
. (5)
The above has a unique global minimum at q∗ ≈ 0.713832, where it equals ≈ 0.50922.
If q∗ < 23 , then by Lemmas 2 through 4, we have that
ERM (F, 2) ≥ (1− q∗)2 ·
(
2
3
− 1
(1− q∗)3
(
2
9
−
(q∗
4
)2
+
1
3
(q∗
2
)3
+
log 2/3
2
))
+
q2∗ · 0.528 + 2q∗(1− q∗) ·
1
2
(
1−
(
q∗
2 · (1 + q∗)
)2)
=
=
(
2
3
(1− q∗)2 − 1
(1− q∗)
(
2
9
−
(q∗
4
)2
+
1
3
(q∗
2
)3
+
log 2/3
2
))
+
q2∗ · 0.528 + q∗(1− q∗)
(
1−
(
q∗
2 · (1 + q∗)
)2)
.
The derivative of the above is negative for q∗ ∈ [0, 2/3], and since at q∗ = 2/3 it coincides with the
lower-bound from Equation (5), we therefore have that ERM (F, 2) > 0.509, regardless of the value
of q∗.
B Auxiliary Technical Results used in Sections 5 and 6
Lemma 5 (Properties of min{q1, q2}). Let m ∈ [0, 1], and let (q1, q2) ∼ U
(
[m, 1]2
)
. The random
variable min{q1, q2} is a random attaining values in [m, 1], whose Cumulative Distribution Function
is Pr [min{q1, q2} ≤ q] = 1−
( 1−q
1−m
)2
, and whose Probability Density Function is µ(q) = 2 1−q
(1−m)2 .
Lemma 6 (Properties of max{q1, q2}). Let (q1, q2) ∼ U
(
[0, 1]2
)
. The random variable max{q1, q2}
is a random variable attaining values in [0, 1] with the following properties:
1. Its Cumulative Distribution Function is Pr [max{q1, q2} ≤ q] = q2, and its Probability Density
Function is µ(q) = 2q.
2. For every q ∈ [0, 1], Eq1,q2
[
max{q1, q2}
∣∣∣max{q1, q2} ≤ q] = 23q.
3. For every q ∈ [0, 1], Eq1,q2
[
max{q1, q2}
∣∣∣max{q1, q2} ≥ q] = 23 · 1−q31−q2 .
C Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. For Part 3:
OPT(α · r) = max
q∈[0,1]
(
α · r(q)) = α · max
q∈[0,1]
r(q) = α ·OPT(r).
For Part 1, for every q ∈ [0, 1]:
vα·r(q) =
α · r(q)
q
= α · r(q)
q
= α · vr(q).
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For Part 2, let q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1]. By Part 1, max
{
vα·r(q1), vα·r(q2)
} ≥ 2 min{vα·r(q1), vα·r(q2)} if and
only if max
{
vr(q1), vr(q2)
} ≥ 2 min{vr(q1), vr(q2)}. We first consider the case where both of these
conditions hold. In this case, by Part 1,
eα·r2 (q1, q2) = α · r
(
arg max
q∈{q1,q2}
vα·r(q)
)
= α · r
(
arg max
q∈{q1,q2}
vr(q)
)
= α · er2(q1, a2).
The case in which neither of these conditions holds is handled similarly, replacing arg max with
arg min.
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